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Abstract
Wittgenstein’s paradoxical theses that unproved propositions are
meaningless, proofs form new concepts and rules, and contradictions
are of limited concern, led to a variety of interpretations, most of them
centered on rule-following skepticism. We argue, with the help of C. S.
Peirce’s distinction between corollarial and theorematic proofs, that his
intuitions are better explained by resistance to what we call conceptual
omniscience, treating meaning as fixed content specified in advance.
We interpret the distinction in the context of modern epistemic logic
and semantic information theory, and show how removing conceptual
omniscience helps resolve Wittgenstein’s paradoxes and explain the
puzzle of deduction, its ability to generate new knowledge and meaning.
Introduction
In his middle and late periods Wittgenstein reached conclusions that sound
paradoxical, and at variance with mathematical practice as commonly un-
derstood. In Philosophical Remarks he argued that unproved propositions
are meaningless and there can not be two different proofs of the same propo-
sition, and in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics – that proofs
form new concepts, and that axioms and inference rules do not determine
what the theorems are.
Dummett’s influential interpretation framed Wittgenstein’s position in
terms of puzzle of deduction, a tension between its two features, “that in
virtue of which we want to say that it yields nothing new, and that in virtue
of which we want to say the opposite” (Dummett, 1973, p. 299)1. Other
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s paradoxes have also been offered, some of
them are briefly reviewed in Section 3. What we would like to do is not to
offer a yet another interpretation of Wittgenstein, but rather to understand
mathematical phenomena he highlights from a novel perspective.
Wittgenstein and his interpreters largely treated all proofs as being of a
kind, but C. S. Peirce, who pondered the puzzle of deduction a century ear-
lier, distinguished between corollarial (routine) and theorematic (creative)
proofs. In the 1960-s Hintikka rediscovered some of Peirce’s ideas on math-
ematical proofs in his epistemic (modal) logic, and used them to resolve
1
the puzzle of deduction. More recently, a broadly Peircian approach to
meaning and interpretation of mathematical proofs has been developed in
semantic information theory (D’Agostino, 2016). We will argue that, de-
spite the dissimilarities between the two thinkers2, Peirce’s view of concepts
and conceptual change in mathematics fits Wittgenstein’s intuitions better
than conventionalist, intuitionist or dialetheist interpretations, and largely
defuses the charges of “radical conventionalism” and “assault on pure math-
ematics”. But it also reveals some flaws in his analysis.
The first two sections discuss the first paradox in the inferentialist frame-
work, characteristic of Wittgenstein’s middle period, and its role in his later
abandonment of inferentialism. We turn to the second paradox and its di-
verse interpretations in Section 3. In Section 4 Peirce’s corollarial/theorematic
distinction is introduced, and related to modern discussions of informal
proofs and informativity of deduction. In Section 5 we use it to argue
that many of Wittgenstein’s theses are independent of the rule-following
skepticism, and can be construed as rejection of the traditional idealization
of conceptual omniscience, found also in Peirce’s philosophy. In Section 6,
motivated by Levy’s refinement of the Peirce’s distinction, we turn to a class
of proofs that we call paradigmatic, which manifest conceptual shifts most
explicitly. A model of mathematics, inspired by modern epistemic logic,
is sketched in Section 7, and it fits well with Wittgenstein’s and Peirce’s
views on contradictions, reviewed in the following section. We summarize
our discussion in Conclusions.
1 No two proofs of one proposition
The first paradox originates in Wittgenstein’s middle period, when he al-
ready believed that meaning of mathematical propositions is determined by
their use, but interpreted this use as use in a “calculus” (Rodych, 1997,
p. 201). To avoid confusion, we will call a codified system for doing calcula-
tions and/or deductions a formalism. Wittgenstein’s reasoning can then be
reconstructed as follows:
P) Meaning is use, and use in a formalism is use for inferring.
Q1) Proposition is meaningful if it is inferentially linked to the axioms
(proved), or if there is a decision procedure for producing such linkage3.
Q2) Unproven propositions without a decision procedure are meaningless.
Q3) “There can not be two independent proofs of one mathematical propo-
sition” (PR4, 1975, p. 184).
Both Q2 and Q3 are paradoxical, but follow from the view of meaning
elaborated in Q1, and are closely intertwined in Wittgenstein’s writing.
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A proof alters a formalism by turning a string of symbols into a usable
proposition, it is the proof, or its blueprint, at least, that enables its use
and makes it meaningful. Hence, it remains meaningless in the absence of
a proof. Another proof of the “same” proposition will alter the meaning
yet further, will link the sentence to different groups of axioms and/or in
different ways, hence the proposition proved will not be the same. It is
only our habit of attaching “shadowy entities”, meanings, to all well-formed
sentences, even those that do not have any use, that leads us to believe in
the sameness.
The fact that his conclusions were at odds with the common sense, and
common use of language, came to be unwelcome in the late period of “phi-
losophy leaves everything as it is”. Late Wittgenstein replaced “calculi”
as meaning givers by language games, and the rule-following considerations
involved in them made the previously transparent notion of inference in a
formalism problematic. But this by itself does not counter the logic of the
no-two-proofs argument. If anything, it makes it even stronger. Proofs are
no longer rigid inferential chains, but performances, whose utility relies on
reproducibility of rule-following. But unproved propositions are still un-
usable, and hence meaningless, and different proofs still give propositions
different meanings.
And yet, in a remark from 1939-40 we read:“Of course it would be non-
sense to say that one propistion can not have two proofs – for we do say
just that” (RFM5, II.58). Wittgenstein still seems to be torn between his
old conception and emerging late outlook, for he adds, “proof is a mathe-
matical entity that can not be replaced by any other; one can say that it
can convince us of something that nothing else can, and this can be given
expression by us assigning to it a proposition that we do not assign to any
other proof” (RFM, II.59). And in II.61 comes a crucial question:“How
far does the application of a mathematical proposition depend on what is
allowed to count as a proof of it and what is not?”
Wittgenstein’s own answer comes in remarks from 1941:
It all depends on what settles the sense of a proposition, what we
choose to say settles its sense. The use of the signs must settle it;
but what do we count as the use? - That these proofs prove the same
proposition means, e.g.: both demonstrate it as a suitable instrument
for the same purpose. And the purpose is an allusion to something
extra-mathematical (RFM, V.7).
This singles out a sense of a proposition that remains unaltered throughout
the play of linkages involved in different proofs, namely, a sense bestowed
on it by extra-mathematical applications. Hence, “concepts which occur
in ‘necessary’ propositions must also occur and have a meaning in non-
necessary ones” (RFM, V.41).
(Steiner, 2009, p. 3) argues that towards the end of 1930-s Wittgenstein’s
thought underwent a “silent revolution”, where he came to see mathematical
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propositions as “hardened” empirical regularities, empirical generalizations
a la´ Mill promoted to the dignity of “inexorable” rules. The same idea
was expressed earlier in (Wright, 1980, p.105), and it seems to be amply
supported by multiple passages in RFM and LFM. The “hardening” ex-
plains stable reproducibility of rule-following, and widespread agreement
on the outcomes of calculations and deductions, as well as applicability of
formalisms to empirical matters, from which they were hardened.
According to a number of scholars6, this new stance had a bonus, per-
haps, a part of motivation for adopting it, of grounding Wittgenstein’s hos-
tility to mathematical logic and the upper reaches of set theory. During the
middle period he could only fault them, or rather their (mis)interpretations,
for assimilating extravagant formal games under familiar concepts like num-
bers and sets. Now he could say more, as in the oft-quoted RFM, IV.2:
I want to say: it is essential to mathematics that its signs are also
employed in mufti. It is the use outside mathematics, and so the
meaning of the signs, that makes the sign-game into mathematics.
Just as it is not logical inference either, for me to make a change from
one formation to another... if these arrangements have not a linguistic
function apart from this transformation.
Moore finds this passage to be “essentially an assault on the very idea of pure
mathematics” (Moore, 2017, p.329). Thus, it seems that Wittgenstein’s own
solution left him at even greater conflict with mathematical practice than
the no-two-proofs paradox it was meant to resolve.
2 Inferentialist solution
Wittgenstein took the unwelcome conclusions of the first paradox as a strike
against its premise, the equating of meaning to use in a formalism. In other
words, he took his argument to be unsound. But, as reconstructed at least,
it is invalid. Even if we identify meaning with inferential role, there is a
problem with passing from P to Q1. Sure enough, the traditional rebut-
tal that comes to mind begs the question against Wittgenstein. We would
like to say that we understand an unproved sentence by understanding its
constituent parts and how they are linked. This is expressed in content the-
ories of meaning and compositionality of language they support. However,
for Wittgenstein this, at best, transplants what applies to the empirical seg-
ment of language onto “grammatical” sentences of mathematics, exactly the
conceptual confusion he combatted in his middle and late periods.
Mirroring a general objection to inferentialism, Dummett also remarked
that “if Wittgenstein were right... communication would be in constant dan-
ger of simply breaking down” (Dummett, 1959, p.339). But inferentialists do
offer accounts of how languages can be mastered non-compositionally (Bran-
dom, 2010, p.336), and communication rarely turns on nuances of meaning,
as the utility of dictionaries indicates.
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Still, there is no need to leave inferentialism behind to make sense of
unproved sentences. There is even no need to compose them from simpler
pieces occurring in other propositions, whose proofs are already known. If
one wishes to use an unproved sentence inferentially one can assume it as a
premise, and see what can be inferred from it. This is what Saccheri and
Lambert did with the negation of the parallel postulate, and it gave them
some idea of its meaning (enough for Saccheri to remark that it is “repugnant
to the nature of straight lines”). And this is what mathematicians continue
to do with odd perfect numbers or the Riemann hypothesis. Conversely, one
can look for other unproved sentences, from which the one in question can
be deduced, or better yet, for ones deductively equivalent to it. This was
Sierpin´ski’s project for the continuum hypothesis. Of course, all such results
are conjectural, but they do show that inferential role does not reduce to a
proof from axioms. Moreover, if and when a proof or disproof of a sentence
is found these conjectural results will be converted into proven or disproven
propositions, and their proofs will quite literally contain the conjectural
inferential chains as parts. Thus, the meaning of a proposition will “contain”
meanings known before the proof even on the inferentialist conception.
This is not to say that “the meaning” stays the same before and after the
proof. By the same reasoning, its inferential role grows considerably. First, a
proof establishes new inferential connections among different sentences of the
formalism, and second, it delivers a new tool for proving other propositions.
The latter does not even require one to be familiar with the proof, just
knowing (trusting) that there is a proof is enough. It is a common practice
among mathematicians to make use of results they do not know proofs of.
To summarize, quite a bit of inferential use can be made of a proposition in
a formalism independently of its proof. So, even on middle Wittgenstein’s
own terms, the argument of the first paradox is flawed.
But then whatever support this gave to altering its premise is also gone.
Of course, Wittgenstein was no longer an inferentialist, so he may have had
independent reasons for insisting on extra-mathematical use. One such rea-
son is hinted at in RFM IV.25:“Understanding a mathematical proposition
is not guaranteed by its verbal form... The logical notation suppresses the
structure”. To Wittgenstein, the “disastrous invasion of mathematics by
logic”, that masks conceptual leaps under deceptive cover of familiar ver-
biage, is a target persisting through changes from the Tractatus to RFM.
However, on the indispensability of extra-mathematical use that put off
Moore and many others, Wittgenstein is, in fact, quite equivocal. After the
mufti quote, he goes on to ask: “If the intended application of mathematics
is essential, how about parts of mathematics whose application – or at least
what mathematicians take for their application – is quite fantastic?... Now,
isn’t one doing mathematics none the less?” (RFM, IV.5). The answer comes
in RFM, V.26 from a year later, and it is not what one might expect:
I have asked myself: if mathematics has a purely fanciful application,
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isn’t it still mathematics? – But the question arises: don’t we call it
‘mathematics’ only because e.g. there are transitions, bridges from the
fanciful to non-fanciful applications?... But in that case isn’t it incor-
rect to say: the essential thing about mathematics is that it forms con-
cepts? – For mathematics is after all an anthropological phenomenon.
Thus we can recognize it as the essential thing about a great part of
mathematics (of what is called ‘mathematics’) and yet say that it plays
no part in other regions... Mathematics is, then, a family; but that is
not to say that we shall not mind what is incorporated into it.
This is hardly “an assault on pure mathematics”. In fact, it is reminiscent
of Quine’s division of mathematics into applied, its “rounding out”, and
“recreational”, and he was not charged with such an assault. It seems that
for Wittgenstein the use in mufti is just a check on the “prose” surrounding
the higher logic and set theory. But, as we saw, neither the first paradox
nor conceptual obfuscation concerns make such a use strictly necessary.
3 Proofs as rule-makers
In the late period Wittgenstein shifts to a much more diffused view of mean-
ing than inferential role in a formalism. Accordingly, proofs are taken to
grow a pre-existing meaning rather than to create it ex nihilo, and their se-
mantic contribution is framed in a broader context of language games. This
leads to the second paradox.
P) Proofs form new concepts and lay down new rules.
Q1) In a proof we “win through to a decision”, placing it “in a system of
decisions” (RFM, II.27).
Q2) Formalism does not determine its theorems.
The main work is clearly done by the premise, and Wittgenstein amasses
considerable amount of evidence to support it in RFM and LFM, see (Wright,
1980, pp. 39-40) for a review. However, there is little consensus on interpret-
ing this premise, because, on traditional views, it appears to be plainly false.
In his influential 1959 interpretation Dummett denounced it as “radical con-
ventionalism”:
He appears to hold that it is up to us to decide to regard any statement
we happen to pick on as holding necessarily, if we choose to do so.
[...] That one has the right simply to lay down that the assertion of a
statement of a given form is to be regarded as always justified, without
regard to the use that has already been given to the words contained
in the statement, seems to me mistaken (Dummett, 1959, p.337).
On Dummett’s reading, Wittgenstein is even more radical than Quine, for
whom holding on to a statement “come what may” at least involves “ad-
justments elsewhere in the system”. But, as (Stroud, 1965) pointed out,
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according to Wittgenstein, most mathematicians are usually compelled to
accept a theorem when presented with a proof. This can hardly be compared
to laying down a convention.
Wright remarks that “it ought to be possible, after we have accepted the
proof, satisfactorily to convey what our understanding of a statement used
to be”, and concludes that it is not, in fact, possible on traditional accounts
of meaning as content. Because if a proof conforms to the old content it
can not also create new one (Wright, 1980, pp. 53-54). He then suggests
that Wittgenstein’s talk of “conceptual change” is figurative, and is meant
to dislodge the traditional figure of “recognizing” what our rules already
dictate, which is generally the target of the rule-following considerations.
Wittgenstein’s figure comes with figures of speech, like “inventions” and
“decisions” in place of “discoveries” and “recognitions”, and is meant to
play a therapeutic role (Ibid. pp. 48-49).
However, as we saw with the first paradox, it is possible, pace Wright, to
give an account of meanings before and after the proof, that makes sense of
meaning change without appealing to rule-following. It involved giving up
the view of meaning as content, even intuitionist content. Moreover, one can
make sense of the change even on content theories, but such a change will
be, as Dummett put it in his modified “more plausible” reading of 19737,
banal. A new characterization of an ellipse, say, would give us a new rule for
recognizing that something is an ellipse, which we did not have before the
proof. But “the new criterion will always agree with the old criteria, when
these are correctly applied in accordance with our original standards... even
if we failed to notice the fact” (Dummett, 1994, p. 53). He then suggests
that a robust interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thesis requires an example in
which old and new criteria disagree, while we are unable to find any mistakes,
either in the proof or in the application of the criteria, a seemingly impossible
feat. We would have to claim that a mistake is there even if we are unable,
in principle, to locate it. Only an all-seeing God can then distinguish the
banal and the robust interpretations, and rejecting such an Olympian view
is exactly Wittgenstein’s point, according to Dummett.
(Steiner, 2009) gives a yet another interpretation, somewhat reminiscent
of Stroud’s, based on a view of rule-following that he attributes to Fogelin.
On this view, we observe widespread agreement on what constitutes follow-
ing a rule, because the rules themselves are empirical regularities promoted
to the dignity of a rule, “hardened”. In Wittgenstein’s own words, “because
they all agree in what they do we lay it down as a rule and put it down in
the archives” (LFM, XI). This Copernican turn throws a new light on the
before and after of a proof. Professionals, trained as they are in the ways of
their language games’ rule-following, will be particularly compelled to ac-
cept a proved proposition as the only possible outcome. But this itself is an
empirical regularity, of behavior after training. And empirical regularities
do break down, training is not destiny. Hence, what a proof delivers, while
not a legislated convention, falls short of a foregone conclusion. Before the
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proof, Wittgenstein continues in LFM:
The road is not yet actually built. You could if you wished assume it
isn’t so. You would get into an awful mess. [...] If we adopt the idea
that you could continue either in this way or in that way (Goldbach’s
theorem true or not true) – then a hunch that it will be proved true is
a hunch that people will find it the only way of proceeding.
This should give some idea of the diversity of opinion on the issue, but
note that most of it revolves around the role of rule-following. After looking
deeper into the puzzle of deduction we will see that rule-following may not
be the only issue.
4 Corollarial/theorematic distinction
Peirce’s self-described “first real discovery about mathematical procedure”
was a generalization to all deductive reasoning of a traditional distinction
between the “logical” and “geometric” consequences in Euclidean geometry,
traceable as far back as Aristotle. The former can be read off of the diagram
directly, while the latter require auxiliary constructions, “which are not
at all required or suggested by any previous proposition, and which the
conclusion... says nothing about” (NEM8, 4:49). Earlier, the distinction
inspired Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic arguments. Most
of Peirce’s writings on the subject remained unpublished until 1970-s, so the
distinction remained buried until Hintikka brought it back from obscurity
in 1979 (Hintikka, 1980), after rediscovering a version of it in his own work.
Peirce developed a diagrammatic version of the first order predicate cal-
culus with quantifiers (existential graphs), which allowed him to argue that
“all necessary reasoning is diagrammatic” (Dipert, 1984, p.56), and extended
the corollarial/theorematic distinction to all deductions. Peirce character-
izes a theorematic proof as introducing a “foreign idea, using it, and finally
deducing a conclusion from which it is eliminated” (NEM, 4:42). This for-
eign idea is “something not implied in the conceptions so far gained, which
neither the definition of the object of research nor anything yet known about
could of themselves suggest, although they give room for it” (NEM, 4:49).
His view is partly supported by the modern studies of diagrammatic rea-
soning (Giaquinto, 2008, p.24ff). But, after Frege, along with construction
generally, the distinction came to be seen as “psychologistic”, and in geom-
etry specifically, as an artifact of its incomplete formalization.
Theorematic reasoning captures the informal idea of mathematicians
about non-triviality of proofs. In contrast, corollarial reasoning is routine,
and is closely related to what middle Wittgenstein called a “decision pro-
cedure”. This suggests that theorematicity should be related to (compu-
tational) complexity of formal deductions. However, even in theories with
effective (algorithmic) proof procedures the actual proving of theorems may
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not be routine, because the procedures are too complex, and, therefore,
intractable. For example, elementary Euclidean geometry and Boolean al-
gebra are effectively decidable, but their general decision procedures are
intractably complex. In its turn, complexity of deductions is related to in-
formativity of their conclusions (D’Agostino, 2016, p.175). If one thinks of
information as, in Hintikka’s slogan, elimination of uncertainty, then one can
see how theorematic proofs are informative. They eliminate genuine uncer-
tainty about what they prove (Ibid., p.178), whereas corollarial (tractably
algorithmic) proofs do not.
Several relevant measures of informativity and complexity of (formal)
deductions have been proposed in modern epistemic logic and semantic in-
formation theory. The first one was Hintikka’s depth, the number of new
layers of quantifiers introduced in the course of proof. It was also moti-
vated by auxiliary constructions in geometry, Hintikka analogizes them to
new “individuals” introduced when new quantified variables are instanti-
ated in natural deduction systems. However, Hintikka’s depth does not
detect all types of theorematic steps. They appear even in proving Boolean
tautologies, where no quantifiers are present, but extra letters and/or con-
nectives are introduced in the intermediate formulae (Dipert, 1984, p.62).
In response, D’Agostino and Floridi proposed to supplement it with a sec-
ond depth, which is in play even in proving Boolean tautologies. It is the
depth of nested subarguments that introduce and discharge additional as-
sumptions in a natural deduction system (D’Agostino, 2016, p.178). Jago
proposed a single alternative measure, the shortest proof length in sequent
calculus without the contractions and the cut (Jago, 2013, p.331). As these
explications show, informativity is relative to the background formalism,
and incremental – the depths or proof lengths depend on a chosen proof
system, and mark heap-like changes rather than sharp divides.
Even so, formalization and measurement of qualitative shifts can only
go so far. Informativity within a formal system invites a picture where
conceptual resources are circumscribed in advance, and deductions simply
spread truth values to some previously undecided propositions. This is a
picture adopted by Dummett. In the same lecture where he modified his
interpretation of Wittgenstein, he insists on what we will call conceptual
omniscience. It is a semantic version of Hintikka’s logical (better to say,
epistemic) omniscience, the idealization that knowledge of premises entails
knowledge of all their deductive consequences. Proofs do grow knowledge,
according to Dummett, but not meaning. That they can not do while staying
faithful to prior content of propositions, they merely facilitate verification of
other claims, mathematical or empirical. Deduction brings new knowledge
despite preserving the meanings 9. And this is enough to affirm a strong
form of deductive determinism: once axioms are laid down the theorems are
determined for everyone but a radical skeptic about rule-following.
However, as already Peirce pointed out, theorematic reasoning involves
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“foreign ideas”, concept formation or transformation over and above the
theorem’s formulation, and the background knowledge. The nature of these
new concepts is suggested by his examples, and is made explicit in mod-
ern semantic information theory. They manifest in the construction and/or
recognition of new patterns, auxiliary figures in geometry, composite struc-
tures in set theory, or compound predicates and propositional formulae in
formal systems (D’Agostino, 2016, p.170). One defines new objects, and/or
finds new ways to describe their properties and interrelations with other
objects, old and new. Many previously proved properties are turned into
new definitions. Conceptual omniscience is problematic because much of
mathematicians’ effort goes into crafting definitions, and few theorems are
proved about objects introduced already in the axioms. Skeletal semantics
of the model theory, that parses formulae down to basic elements, is not
the semantics of informal proofs (Azzouni, 2009, p.18). To use Dummett’s
own example, the concept of ellipse does not appear in either planimetric or
stereometric axioms, and it is only one among an infinite variety of objects
they give room for. That theorems about ellipses should be proved at all is
not determined by the formalism.
Of course, ellipses are strongly motivated by common observations, but
this suggests exactly the empirically mediated “determinacy” that Wittgen-
stein describes. In the practice of mathematics, definitions do more than
single out formal patterns. Newly formed concepts are linked to concepts
from other formalisms, informal intuitions, and applications outside of math-
ematics. When conceptual resources are specified in advance, the interpre-
tational labor required to make proofs and theorems meaningful can not
be captured by them. And “without an interpretation of the language of
the formal system the end-formula of the derivation says nothing; and so
nothing is proved” (Giaquinto, 2008, p.26). The meaning of unproved the-
orems is not determined because, after all, we may not be smart enough to
deduce them, let alone anticipate concepts to be introduced in their proofs,
or statements. The appearance of elliptic curves and modular forms in the
Wiles’s proof of the Last Fermat theorem gives an idea of just how much
new concept formation can be involved.
The above discussion makes clear that while informativity detects (in
degrees) the need for concept formation, it can not express it. Peirce’s
theorematicity is intended to capture the accompanying conceptual labor
involved even when working in completely formalized deductive systems.
Thus, pace Dummett, we can make non-banal sense of how proofs form new
concepts and rules without offering impossible counterexamples to proved
theorems.
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5 Wittgenstein and theorematic proofs
As we argued, proofs can involve conceptual change even aside from the
rule-following indeterminacy. The irony is that not only the commentators
tended to overlook the corollarial/theorematic distinction, but so did late
Wittgenstein himself. The difference is that if they, in effect, treated all
deductive reasoning as corollarial, he treated it all as theorematic. Middle
Wittgenstein admitted, at least occasionally, that effective decision proce-
dures give sense even to unproved propositions:“We may only put a question
in mathematics (or make a conjecture) where the answer runs:“I must work
it out”” (PR, p.151). But late Wittgenstein dropped the distinction in favor
of a uniform approach. This approach might have, indeed, caused a radical
breakdown in communication – between him and his interpreters. If a proof
involves conceptual change no matter what kind of proof it is, one needs
a conception of change that applies to all cases, even the simplest cases,
corollarial ones.
While most of Wittgenstein’s examples are theorematic10, he is also fond
of stressing the equivalence between a formalism and a calculus, deduction
and calculation. On Peirce’s view, the essential difference is that calculation
(as in adding and multiplying numbers) involves no theorematic steps, one
just works it out. But, at the same time, the distinction is relative and
incremental, so Wittgenstein might have seen no philosophical ground to
draw a sharp line in the sand.
Whatever his reasons, Wittgenstein forced his interpreters to fit his con-
ceptual change thesis even to the most routine of calculations, and to explain
how to conceive of it when informativity of deduction all but disappears.
And this invariably left general rule-following indeterminacy as the only vi-
able option, see e.g. (Wright, 1980, pp. 48–49, 145–147). In hindsight, one
can see how applying even the paper-and-pencil addition algorithm to nev-
ertofore seen numbers has a residue of theorematicity to it. Because who
is to say that the addition as previously grasped is not really quaddition,
and so 68+57=5 (Kripke, 1982, p. 9). But without the benefit of examples
where the “foreign idea” is more substantive, it is easy to miss the non-
banal residue. The addition algorithm has been mechanized since the first
arithmometers, and one needs thick thick skeptical glasses to discern new
concept formation in adding 68 to 57. Wright arrives at something like this
infinitesimal theorematic residue reading when drawing contrast to the more
substantive case of the Last Fermat Theorem:
All that doing number theory does is acquaint us with a variety of
constructions which are deemed analogous... A proof of Fermat’s the-
orem, if we get one11, may not closely mimic these other constructions;
it may rather appeal to a general concept which they illustrate, and
then present new methods as relevant to it... In contrast, we can cir-
cumscribe the technique relevant to the solution of some problem of
effectively decidable type absolutely exactly (Wright, 1980, p.55).
Late Wittgenstein might have (legitimately) taken exception to the “ab-
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solutely”, but, perhaps, it would have better served his ends to offer a sop
to Cerberus12, instead of ignoring the contrast altogether. As it is, even
Wright only gives the above interpretation in the context of ascribing to
Wittgenstein the intuitionist semantics of proofs (p. 54), and later uses the
same intuitionist gloss in discussing the occurrence of 777 in the decimal
expansion of pi (p.145). There he remarks that, if we only had loose analo-
gies, the amount of uncertainty involved “contrasts with the scope which we
should expect occasionally to have for discretion” (p.150).
Thus, we are left with general rule-following skepticism directly applied
to the decimal expansion of pi. But such skepticism infects any discourse,
including empirical assertions that Wittgenstein pains to distinguish from
mathematical ones. If “the further expansion of an irrational number is a
further expansion of mathematics” (RFM, IV.9) means that genuine discre-
tion can be exercised in deciding whether 777 occurs or not, Wittgenstein
is in trouble. But, as the texts quoted by Fogelin and Steiner suggest, this
is not what it means. The absence of a reason for rule-following is not a
reason for the absence of rule-following. Wittgenstein did not deny that
rule-following in proofs typically produces a determinate result, he argued
that traditional accounts misconstrue the nature of this determinacy.
In short, the corollarial/theorematic perspective explains away and/or
accommodates diverging interpretations of the second paradox, and dulls
its edge in the process. Its conclusion is revealed to hold for all proofs only
legalistically13, substantively only for theorematic proofs, and even then not
in the sense of leaving room for genuine discretion required by Dummett for
non-banality. Still, this is only a part of the story.
6 From theorematic to paradigmatic
As we saw, distinguishing corollarial and theorematic proofs helps contex-
tualize Wittgenstein’s theses, and move the focus away from rule-following.
But theorematic proofs are not all created equal. Levy pointed out that
under the heading of theorematic reasoning Peirce describes a wide range
of examples (Levy, 1997, p. 99). On the one end, we have Euclid’s auxiliary
lines, and clever algebraic substitutions; on the other, Fermat’s “infinite de-
scent” (mathematical induction), and Cantor’s diagonal argument applied
to general power sets. Theorematicity comes in degrees, but in the two latter
cases the historical context suggests more than a difference in degree. Euclid
and Cardano were applying already established axioms14 of geometry and
algebra, while Fermat, and especially Cantor, were introducing new ones.
Levy describes the distinction as between using ideas logically implied
by principles already adopted, perhaps tacitly, and ideas requiring adoption
of new principles (Ibid.). Let us call proofs appealing to such new principles
paradigmatic, the word often used by Wittgenstein himself for similar pur-
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poses. In Peirce’s terms, paradigmatic proofs appeal to something not only
unimplied by conceptions so far gained, but what they do not even give room
for. This is an informal analog of non-conservative extensions of a formal
theory. A conservative extension introduces new concepts and principles
whose use can be eliminated from the proofs, as long as they are absent
from the theorems’ statements. In contrast, in a non-conservative extension
previously undecidable propositions may become provable (Azzouni, 2009,
p. 20). For example, a strengthened form of Ramsey’s theorem about graph
colorings, due to Parris and Harrington, is undecidable in Peano arithmetic,
but is provable in ZFC set theory.
Of course, what principles do give room for is somewhat open to inter-
pretation, unless they are completely formalized. In informal practice, the
theorematic/paradigmatic boundary is blurred, for mathematicians rarely
work within a fixed formal system. The Wiles’s, or Parris-Harrington’s,
proofs were not seen as paradigmatic (in the narrow sense), because mod-
ern number theorists do not confine their paradigm to Peano arithmetic.
In these terms, theorematic proofs extend the theorem’s background, albeit
conservatively (in the broad sense), while corollarial ones do not.
The theorematic/paradigmatic divide also parallels Toulmin’s distinc-
tion between the warrant-using and warrant-establishing arguments in the
argumentation theory, for which he invokes Ryle’s metaphor of traveling
along a railway already built versus building a new one (Toulmin, 1958,
p. 120). He also points out that, historically, “deductions” referred to all
warrant-using arguments, not only to formal ones. They included, for ex-
ample, astronomers’ calculations of eclipses based on Newton’s theory, and
Sherlock Holmes’s surmises from crime scene evidence, which certainly in-
volved theorematic steps. The parallel with Wittgenstein’s own metaphors
of building “new roads for traffic” (RFM, I.165), “designing new paths for
the layout of a garden” (RFM, I.166), and “building a road across the moors”
(LFM, X) should be plain. Except for Wittgenstein, every proof ushers in a
new paradigm, he distinguishes the paradigmatic from the theorematic no
more than the theorematic from the corollarial, at least not explicitly.
Most of the commentary tacitly assumed that “proofs” are proofs in
modern-style formalisms, with explicitly stated axioms and rules of infer-
ence. But most of Wittgenstein’s examples in RFM involve historical proofs
produced in no such formalisms. Moreover, in RFM, II.80 he explicitly
states: “It is often useful in order to help clarify a philosophical problem, to
imagine the historical development, e.g. in mathematics, as quite different
from what it actually was. If it had been different no one would have had
the idea of saying what is actually said” [emphasis added, SK]. Let us look
at some of Wittgenstein’s examples in this light.
That angle trisection is possible by neusis (withmarked straightedge and
compass), was known in antiquity, and that Euclid would rule out such con-
structions was not determined by loose idea of straightedge and compass.
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Similarly, identifying Dedekind cuts with real numbers was not determined
by special real numbers, and vague generalities about them, known before
Dedekind. Indeed, the prevailing conception of the continuum was Aris-
totelian, on which it is not assembled from points/numbers at all. Wittgen-
stein charges that Dedekind established a new rule for what a real number
is under the misleading cover of a familiar geometric cut:“The division of
rational numbers into classes did not originally have any meaning, until we
drew attention to a particular thing that could be so described. The concept
is taken over from the everyday use of language and that is why it immedi-
ately looks as if it had to have a meaning for numbers too” (RFM, IV.34).
The cut is exactly a composite structure, a new pattern, generally impli-
cated in the concept formation through proofs. Moreover, as we now know,
even arithmetized continuum does not have to consist of Dedekind cuts, the
real numbers, it could instead be hyperreal or the absolute continuum of
Conway, both containing infinitesimals.
Another example, Cantor’s diagonal argument, brought in a controver-
sial at the time idea of actual infinity, and an even more controversial idea
of comparing such infinities according to Hume’s principle of bijective cor-
respondence. Even Bolzano, Cantor’s precursor, rejected Hume’s princi-
ple because for infinite sets it contradicted Euclid’s part-whole axiom (the
whole is greater than its part) (Mancosu, 2009, p.625). Go¨del gave an influ-
ential argument that Cantor-style cardinalities were inevitable as measures
of infinite size, but (as we now know) alternative measures that preserve
the part-whole axiom, so-called numerosities, were later found nonetheless
(Mancosu, 2009, p.637). Wittgenstein objects that instead of emphasizing
the disanalogy between real and natural numbers, which the diagonal ar-
gument brings out, cardinality talk reduces it to a mere difference in size.
Again, “the dangerous, deceptive thing” is “making what is determination,
formation, of a concept look like a fact of nature” (RFM, App. II.3).
Wittgenstein, it seems, has a case to resist the idealization of concep-
tual omniscience, whether he intended to make it or not. In the case of
paradigmatic proofs, not only are Dummett’s impossible counterexamples
not needed, they are, in fact, possible. One might object that only complete
formalization fixes the meaning of concepts, and in paradigmatic cases we
are dealing with informal proofs operating with loose concepts. But this is
how mathematics evolved historically: we did not have formal concepts prior
to a proof, and had it conform to them, formalisms were developed after, if
not as a result of, the proof’s adoption. Prior use employed concepts, such
as they were, that were consistent with adoption of conflicting alternatives.
If one of them is then adopted, what is it if not conceptual change?
Of course, Dummett saw Wittgenstein as talking about proofs in a mod-
ern formalism, and he might concede the change introduced by paradigmatic
proofs as again a banal point, that is what makes them paradigmatic. Fair
enough. But conceptual determinacy is often claimed even for paradigmatic
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cases, as with Cantor’s cardinalities, and this claim is then relied upon to
present proving in a formalism as a model, a cleaned up version, a “rational
reconstruction”, as Carnap and Reichenbach called it, of how mathematical
knowledge is acquired. Moreover, as we argue next, the paradigmatic shades
into the theorematic just as the theorematic shades into the corollarial.
7 Epistemic model of mathematics
What might an alternative model of mathematical development, more hos-
pitable to Wittgenstein’s intuitions, look like? It will be helpful to frame the
changes induced by proofs in terms of epistemic logic. A formalized version
of such a picture is developed in (Jago, 2009, p.329)15.
At any given time, only some propositions of the formalism are known
(proved). Not even all of their corollarial consequences can be said to be
known, not because there is a problem with deducing them, but because
there may be no reason to turn attention to them. When an occasion arises,
say in applications, they will be deduced as a matter of routine. We may
even take some low grade theorematic reasoning (below a vaguely marked
threshold) as part of the routine, this resembles what Kuhn called “normal
science” of “puzzle-solving”. There are also propositions, like intermediate
formulae in cumbersome computations, that are only significant in context of
deducing something else, and would not be attended to on their own. They
may be corollarial, but even if they already occurred in known proofs they
may not be portable enough to register as independent items of knowledge.
They only become epistemically relevant when one is working through a
known proof, or attempting a new one.
What we have, then, is an epistemic core of theorems surrounded by a
desert of unclaimed and/or technical propositions, through which passage to
any (truly) new theorem lies. The core is immersed into an informal shell of
motivations, analogies, interpretations, and applications, that supplement
the meaning of concepts featured in it, and may, occasionally, even conflict
with the formalism. But whatever the formalism does express conceptually,
is largely limited to its epistemic core. The shell motivates some anticipa-
tions and hunches extending beyond it, and some non-core parts may be
explored – by deriving antecedents and consequents of some conjectures,
and exploring new concepts and techniques that show promise.
We can now better appreciate similarities and differences between theo-
rematic and paradigmatic proofs. Both will expand the epistemic core and
constrain the informal shell, by sorting conflicting intuitions and providing
new rules for “puzzle-solving”. A theorematic proof will do so conservatively,
making new rules seem like validations of prior commitments. A paradig-
matic proof, in contrast, will have to negotiate axioms already adopted, and
informal anticipations of the shell. This is how it was with the Cantor-
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Dedekind arithmetization of the continuum, or with Zermelo’s well-ordering
proof. Of course, a theorematic proof may reveal that formal terms conflict
too much with their informal counterparts (as almost happened with Zer-
melo’s proof). However, if anything is rejected in such a situation, it will
not be the proof itself, but rather the formalism, at least on the traditional
account.
There is a problem with that account, however. We can legislate that
accepting a proof always counts as “conforming” to prior rules, and altering
the formalism counts as “modifying” them, but this convention is at odds
with historical practice. A foreign idea in theorematic proofs may be treated
as transgressing the rules, rather than as conforming to them, for the rules
may not have been meant to be applied this way. Conversely, a proof may
induce a conceptual shift even if it accords with previously adopted rules.
Weierstrass’s example of a continuous nowhere differentiable function
caused a shift in the understanding of continuity, even though it followed
the already adopted formal definition of Cauchy. Presumably, to conform to
prior concepts one would have had to change the formalism. This illustrates
how a formalism’s ability to fix concepts does not extend far beyond its epis-
temic core. Uninterpreted formal theorems may be syntactically determined
by the formal transcription rules, but, as such, they are conceptually thin,
“understanding a mathematical proposition is not guaranteed by its ver-
bal form”. And conceptualized theorems are not fixed by formalism alone,
and therefore are not determined by it. The case for determinism turns
not (merely) on rule-following, but on conceptual omniscience, without it
Wittgenstein’s thesis is defensible.
The syntactic idealization is at odds even with the Platonist and intu-
itionist accounts, where the formalisms do not fully capture semantic con-
sequence and mathematical truth, the very accounts that motivate content
theories of meaning. The axiom of replacement was added to Zermelo’s orig-
inal axiomatization of set theory because the latter was seen as inadequate
to express the Cantorian “inductive conception of sets”. The subsequent
search for large and larger cardinals indicates that even ZFC does not fully
capture that conception. In fact, any formalism, including Euclidean geome-
try and Peano arithmetic, can not fully capture “intended” concepts on the
Platonist or intuitionist interpretations of mathematics. Those belong to
the platonic realm, or to the synthetic potential of a quasi-Kantian subject.
But if revision of formalisms need not amount to conceptual revision,
then their affirmation need not amount to conceptual conformity either.
And if so, every novel proof does put the formalism on the line, and forces a
decision one way or the other. Even if the proof is accepted, we still have a
conceptual shift and a new rule, an extension of mathematics. Wittgenstein
might have expressed himself thus: a formalism may determine its theorems
(barring the rule-following indeterminacy), but not what they mean, and a
new proof may reveal that it failed to mean our concepts. Put this way,
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Wittgenstein’s point is neither conventionalist nor banal, it is, indeed, a
radical departure, but not from the mathematical practice. Rather, it is a
departure from the prevailing philosophical prose of its rational reconstruc-
tion, which presupposes conceptual omniscience.
8 Ex falso nihil fit
That lateWittgenstein’s intuitions line up with the epistemic model of math-
ematics is further corroborated by his view of contradictions. If a formalism
is inconsistent then, under the ex falso quodlibet rule, anything, literally,
goes. But does this mean that an inconsistent formalism fails to capture
any concepts? From the epistemic perspective, the only contradictions that
affect practice are the known ones. Hidden contradictions, beyond the epis-
temic core, can not threaten the use of a formalism, and therefore do not
preclude it from being conceptually meaningful. If a theorematic foreign
idea leads to a contradiction we may take it as a sign that the formalism
was no good, but we may also take it as a sign that the foreign idea was
too foreign, and save (the consistent fragment of) the formalism by blocking
its use. This is how Russell saved Frege’s system, by restricting the Basic
Law V16. Wittgenstein’s own example is arithmetic:“If a contradiction were
now actually found in arithmetic – that would only prove that an arithmetic
with such a contradiction in it could render very good service; and it would
be better for us to modify our concept of the certainty required, than to say
that it really not yet have been a proper arithmetic” (RFM, V.28). And this
explains his ex falso nihil fit proposal:“Well then, don’t draw any conclusions
from a contradiction. Make that a rule”(LFM, XXI).
While dialetheists do count Wittgenstein as a precursor (Priest and
Routley, 1989), it does not seem that he had something like paraconsis-
tent logic in mind. Paraconsistent logicians go to much trouble beyond
the ex falso nihil fit to neutralize contradictions. This is because, as Tur-
ing already pointed out at one of Wittgenstein’s lectures, any conclusions,
derivable from a contradiction in a classical formalism can also be derived
without going through any contradictions. Rules of inference have to be
altered quite dramatically to block all such derivations.
This is only needed, however, if one insists on syntactic, mechanizable
transcription rules. Wittgenstein’s “rule” amounts instead to boxing the
formalism within its prior epistemic core, where no contradictions arise.
This consistent fragment stood, and was used, on its own, it is only the ex
post facto projection of contradictions derived later that makes one think
that there was anything wrong with it. “‘Up to now a good angel has
preserved us from going this way’. Well, what more do you want? One
might say, I believe: a good angel will always be necessary whatever you
do” (RFM, II.81). In a way, this is Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the Gettier
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problem of epistemic luck in mathematics.
A good angel, it is true, is already relied upon in assuming that train-
ing is effective and machines do not break down, but it still helps to take
precautions. Reliability, like theorematicity, comes in degrees, and Wittgen-
stein is disregarding, it seems, the higher reliability of mechanizable rules,
as opposed to an open-ended “if I see a contradiction, then will be the time
to do something about it” (Ibid.). What we do not use can not hurt us, he
argues, and even when a contradiction comes to light – “what prevents us
from sealing it off? That we do not know our way about in the calculus.
Then that is the harm” (Ibid.). However, it is prudent to minimize stum-
bling around even when we do not (yet) know our way about, and we know
empirically that mechanizable rules are apt to accomplish that17. Therefore,
they are preferable by the late Wittgenstein’s own lights, it is only the prose
surrounding them that he can object to.
Ramsey, a presumed bridge between Peirce and Wittgenstein, antici-
pated some ideas of epistemic (“human”) logic in his papers written around
1929, when he worked with Wittgenstein at Cambridge. The passages on
consistency quoted in (Marion, 2012, p.71) are quite suggestive:
We want our beliefs to be consistent not only with one another but
also with the facts: nor is it even clear that consistency is always
advantageous; it may well be better to be sometimes right than never
right. Nor when we wish to be consistent are we always able to be:
there are mathematical propositions whose truth or falsity cannot as
yet be decided. [...] human logic or the logic of truth, which tells men
how they should think, is not merely independent of but sometimes
actually incompatible with formal logic.
Peirce’s pragmatic attitude towards hidden contradictions is also known
(Murphey, 1961, p.237), it follows from his general rejection of the Cartesian
“paper” doubt. According to Peirce, mathematics generally has no need for
formal logic, as its own method of ideal experimentation is more basic, and
consistency of mathematical theories, like any other scientific claim, is to be
doubted only when there comes up a specific reason to do so. And if it should
happen, Peirce, like Wittgenstein, was confident that mathematicians will
be up to the task of addressing it. However, Peirce was equally pragmatic
about the usefulness of rigor and formal rules, indeed he developed a number
of formal systems himself.
Tolerance of contradictions reinforces our earlier point about conceptual
determinacy: if deducing a contradiction does not “nullify” the original
formalism the latter can not be said to determine its conceptual meaning
simply by syntactic consequence. Inconsistency is yet another symptom of
the coming apart between formalisms and informal shells that make them
meaningful.
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9 Conclusions
We argued that Wittgenstein’s first paradox is aimed against static theories
of meaning, semantics of fixed content. Unproved theorems are not quite
meaningless, even on inferentialist semantics, but their meaning grows with
new proofs. Proving “the same” proposition twice is like entering the Hera-
clitean river twice, – it is not quite the same. The second paradox replaces
inferentialism with a pragmatist, in spirit, semantics of rule-governed prac-
tice. That a formalism grounded in it determines its theorems can only be
maintained if the formalism is assumed to have preconceived content, and
to be executed by clockwork subjects. Once these idealizations are dropped
indeterminacy of theorems loses the air of a paradox, even without break-
down in the rule-following clockwork. Higher tolerance for contradictions
also becomes more palatable in this de-idealized picture.
This is not to say that Wittgenstein’s arguments are without flaws.
Proofs bring conceptual change in degrees, noted already by Peirce, at the
extremes of which we find mechanical corollarial proofs and trailblazing
paradigmatic ones, with a theorematic continuum in between. While only
the rule-following considerations make corollarial conclusions indeterminate,
theorematic conclusions display genuine indeterminacy, due to conceptual
limitations of the formalism’s users. Idealizing away these limitations, and
the conceptual flux they create, leads to the puzzle of deduction’s triviality,
on traditional accounts of mathematics. Semantics of preconceived content
can only accommodate Wittgenstein’s theses as banalities. Paraconsistent
logic is still off the mark with its syntactic blocking of blatant contradic-
tions that did not bother Wittgenstein. But, perhaps, hidden contradictions
should have bothered him some more, in view of the pragmatic advantages
that consistent formalisms provide when it comes to the “use in mufti”.
Finally, while traditional accounts overstate conceptual determinacy and
fixity of meaning, Wittgenstein’s alternative faces the opposite problem. The
puzzle of deduction remains, albeit turned on its head – it is not the non-
triviality of deduction that becomes puzzling, but rather its conformity to
prior use (Dummett, 1973, p. 301). Wittgenstein’s allusions to empirical reg-
ularities in this regard are intriguing, but obscure, relations between mean-
ing, content and empirical regularities need further elaboration. There is a
similar, and better understood, puzzle concerning the continuity of knowl-
edge across Kuhn’s scientific revolutions, which may provide some guidance.
Epistemic logic offers an illuminating perspective onWittgenstein’s para-
doxes, but the extensional turn it took in Hintikka’s and subsequent work
would likely make it unattractive to Wittgenstein. Jago, for instance, takes
as a platitude Hintikka’s thesis that epistemic growth amounts to ruling out
possibilities, with the possibilities described in terms of (classically impos-
sible) possible worlds (Jago, 2009, p.329). But this is only a platitude if
one accepts that possibilities are conceptually determined, and specifiable
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in advance. Development of knowledge can be described as narrowing down
pre-existent options only if we are deploying concepts that will emerge before
they actually do. This is exactly the conceptual omniscience, the Olympian
view, that Wittgenstein took pains to oppose.
Peirce offered an alternative approach, that Wittgenstein might have
found more congenial. Instead of working with conceptually determined
possibilities, like the possible worlds, he talked of constraints on them in
terms of vague descriptions. Such constraints on future knowledge can be
formulated even in terms of past concepts, without the Olympian view.
How continuity of knowledge across scientific revolutions can be understood
along the Peircean lines is sketched e.g. in (Short, 2007, p. 274ff.). A sim-
ilar approach to mathematics seems promising. Unfortunately, intensional
approaches to epistemic modality remain underdeveloped.
Notes
1. On Dummett’s reading, Wittgenstein’s position takes on a Heraclitean or Hegelian
flavor. According to (Papa-Grimaldi, 1996, p. 312), “the Hegelian logic is not a solution
of [Zeno’s] paradox but a dismissal of the logical coordinates that generate it”. Compare
to Dummett’s: “Holism is not, in this sense, a theory of meaning: it is the denial that a
theory of meaning is possible” (Dummett, 1973, p. 309).
2. Relationship between Peirce’s and late Wittgenstein’s positions is complicated. “Mean-
ing is use” is reminiscent of the pragmatic maxim (but qualified as “sometimes, but not al-
ways”), and “a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation” is akin to Peirce’s habit
change analysis. However, a detailed examination of the available evidence in (Boncom-
pagni, 2016, Ch.1) concludes that “Wittgenstein expresses a basically negative attitude
towards pragmatism as a Weltanschauung, but acknowledges affinities with pragmatism
as a method”. It is known that Wittgenstein read James extensively, and spent a year
(1929) working with Ramsey, who developed his own version of semantic pragmatism
based on Peirce’s early works (Marion, 2012). Boncompagni speculates that Wittgenstein
read Peirce’s collection Chance, Love, and Logic, Ramsey’s source, some time after 1929.
Ramsey was also a precursor of epistemic logic, with key ideas developed around 1929.
3. There is some oscillation on Wittgenstein’s part, noted in (Plebani, 2010, p. 99), as to
whether merely having a decision procedure is enough to give meaning.
4. Standard abbreviations are used for Wittgenstein’s works: PR for Philosophical Re-
marks, RFM for Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics, and LFM for Lectures on
Foundations of Mathematics.
5. There are two different editions of RFM cited in the literature, with different numbering
of the remarks. We cite the MIT paperback edition, as does Wright, but not Rodych and
Steiner.
6. See e.g. (Moore, 2017, p.329), (Plebani, 2010, p. 28), (Rodych, 1997, p. 218) and
(Steiner, 2009, p. 23).
7. Dummett reaffirmed and elaborated on his modified reading in (Dummett, 1994), which
reproduces some passages from his 1973 lecture almost verbatim.
8. NEM v:p is a standard abbreviation for The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles
S. Peirce, v volume, p page.
9. Dummett’s solution to the puzzle of deduction is criticized in (Haack, 1982).
10. Examples of proofs discussed in RFM include: conversion of strokes into decimals,
occurrence of 770/777 in the decimal expansion of pi, impossibility of listing fractions in
the order of magnitude, impossibility of angle trisection with straightedge and compass,
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recursive abbreviations in Principia, Cantor’s diagonal argument, identification of real
numbers with Dedekind cuts, and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
11. Wright was writing in 1980. Wiles first announced his proof in 1993, but it contained
a gap. The final version, completed in collaboration with Taylor, did not appear until
1995.
12. In a 1908 letter to lady Welby Peirce explains his description of a sign as having effect
upon a person as follows:“My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop to Cerberus, because
I despair of making my own broader conception understood”.
13. Commenting on his provocative early assertion that “any statement can be held true
come what may”, Quine writes in Two Dogmas in Retrospect: “This is true enough in a
legalistic sort of way, but it diverts attention from what is more to the point: the varying
degrees of proximity to observation...”.
14. Of course, even in the case of Euclid, “axiom” in the modern sense applies only loosely.
15. Jago conceives of the epistemic core very differently, and abstracts from informal
shell. In Conclusions, we explain why his formal framework may also be unattractive to
Wittgenstein due to conceptual omniscience concerns.
16. Basic Law V leads to unrestricted comprehension and Russell’s paradox.
17. A telling example is the practice of the Italian school of algebraic geometry in Wittgen-
stein’s lifetime under Enriques and Severi, who adopted a more laissez faire attitude to
mathematical rigor, and relied on intuition to find their way about. The results produced
by the Italians eventually became unreliable, and later had to be reworked in the formal
framework of Weil and Zariski. Mumford wrote about Severi’s 1935-1950 work: “It is
hard to untangle everywhere what he conjectured and what he proved and, unfortunately,
some of his conclusions are incorrect” (Brigaglia et al., 2004, p. 326).
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